


LIEF: Learning to Influence through Evaluative Feedback

Ramona Merhej and Mohamed Chetouani

Inter-Agent Rewards







How can agents *learn* an effective *rewarding policy* to increase cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning?

Related Work

Influencing an opponent

- Opponent Modelling:
- → gradient-based opponent:
 - Zhang, C. et al., 2010
 - Foerster, J. et al., 2018
 - Letcher, A. et al., 2018
- → non gradient-based opponent:
 - Xie, A. et al., 2020

Previous works:

Influencing opponent through regular actions

Our work:

Influencing opponent through rewards


Optimal reward functions

- Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL):
- → given optimal policy or trajectories, can we recover R? (Ng, A. Y., & Russell, S. J., 2000)
- AutoRL:
- → given a goal or a task, can we recover R? (Chiang, H. T. L. et al., 2019)
- Adversarial RL:
- → given optimal adversarial policy or trajectories and R_env, can we recover R_adv? (Rakhsha, A. et al., 2020; Zhang, X. et al., 2020)

Our work:

→ given a gradient-based opponent and without prior access to a desired opponent policy, can we recover R_peer?

The Model




Game policy:


$$\sum_{t=0}^T \gamma_g^t (r_t^k + f_t^k)$$


Feedback policy:

$$\sum_{t=0}^{T} \gamma_f^t(r_t^{k+1} + c_t^{k+1}) - \sum_{t=0}^{T} \gamma_f^t(r_t^k + c_t^k)$$

Experiments 1/2: Teacher-Student









Experiments 2/2: Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Actions	A2 - C	A2 - D
A1 - C	(-1, -1)	(-3,0)
A1 - D	(0, -3)	(-2, -2)





Conclusion



Performing one look-ahead step allows agents to correctly reward each other in simple environments without a prior knowledge of the optimal opponent policy

- → How does this method scale for larger state spaces?
- \rightarrow How does it scale with n players?



Only negative peer rewarding was tested

→ How would agents learn to reward using positive feedback instead?



The feedback dynamics, i.e., the ratio between the value of the given feedback and its cost are crucial for effective learning

→ At what point do the immediate costs of sending feedback become larger than their long term benefits?

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Thank you for your attention!